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ABSTRACT
Privacy and surveillance take on new forms through social
software technologies. Privacy may not be achieved by be-
ing let alone, rather, by choosing a group of people whom
are trusted with one’s data. Similarly, surveillance takes the
form of monitoring users’ data rather than monitoring users
themselves. To offer privacy and counter surveillance, the
“privacy as control” paradigm focuses on approaches that
offer as much data control as possible. In practice, offering
control to users depends on assigning control to non-user
entities, who may have surveillance capabilities, which re-
sults in an interdependency of privacy and surveillance. This
interdependency is problematic and contradicts what data
control approaches should offer. In this paper, we examine
this interdependency in data control within social software.
We put forward criteria to evaluate the degree of control and
privacy and the degree of surveillance entailed by a data
control approach. We perform a comparative analysis of
data control approaches in the technical and the legal con-
text. The analysis shows how certain aspects of surveillance
are deeply rooted in the realisations of “privacy as control”.
We argue that data control approaches should offer trans-
parency, reciprocity and a balanced degree of control as a
first step towards addressing the interdependency of privacy
and surveillance.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Human and societal aspects
of security and privacy; • Social and professional
topics → Privacy policies; Surveillance; •Networks
→ Online social networks; •Information systems→ Data
access methods; Database administration; •Social and pro-
fessional topics→Government technology policy; Internet
governance;
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1. INTRODUCTION
The concepts of privacy and surveillance take new forms
in social software technologies. Privacy and surveillance are
two important concepts in relation to data disclosure and
communication. Traditionally, privacy refers to the right of
an individual to be isolated or anonymous [32, 20]. Through
privacy, it is possible to avoid surveillance. However, the
nature of social software communication affects how these
two concepts are viewed and practiced. In social software,
privacy may not be achieved through being alone if one is
to use the software. Rather, it is a compromise between
disclosing data to a set of trustees and hiding it from others.
Surveillance takes a new form of monitoring users through
their data disclosure. Surveillance is achievable through the
utilisation of social software to monitor users. In such cases,
privacy may not necessarily counter such surveillance [7].
“Privacy as control” (PaC ) is one of the most fundamental
aspects of daily use of social software. PaC is a research
paradigm of privacy management approaches through data
control [10]. Social software users can disclose their personal
data to various types of audiences. To manage their privacy,
users can employ data control approaches. Data control
approaches offer users control on where and to whom their
data is disclosed to avoid inappropriate access, tracking, and
surveillance. Data control approaches include two classes,
namely, access control and accountability. Access control
offers means to control who can access data, how, and for
what purpose. Accountability offers the verification of the
correct enforcement of data control users have. Data control
approaches are realised in different ways in technical and
legal frameworks.
Although PaC aims at facilitating privacy, in practice, it
involves a certain degree of surveillance. PaC approaches are
realised differently in technical and legal frameworks. In the
two frameworks, giving total control to users is challenging
and may not be feasible [26]. In the technical framework,
the complexity of data control approaches requires involv-
ing functional entities—other than users—to deploy these
approaches. Such entities control users’ data and monitor
their actions. With such control, functional entities have
surveillance powers. In the legal framework, similar entities
are required to monitor users to enforce the laws and de-
tect violations. We refer to the surveillance that is required
for the functioning of data control approaches as functional
surveillance. Functional surveillance is essential to ensure
privacy management. At the same time, there is no guaran-
tee that functional surveillance may not be used for surveil-
lance of users. In such a case, functional surveillance can
turn the social software into a panopticon [14].
The interdependency of privacy and surveillance hinders
the assessment of the degree of control and privacy users can
have. Functional surveillance in PaC demonstrates an inter-
dependency of privacy and surveillance. While privacy aims
at countering surveillance, it may utilise functional surveil-
lance. Functional surveillance can facilitate and hinder pri-
vacy. As a result, the control required by functional entities
may limit users’ control. Functional surveillance affects the
offerings of data control approaches and their effectiveness.
The main challenge to assessing the offerings of data control
approaches is that control is an abstract concept. Control
cannot be quantified; however, it can be assessed by the as-
pects it affects. In this article, we investigate the degree
of control, privacy and the related surveillance issues. Our
contribution can be summarised as follows:
• Presenting PaC in theory and in practice, and dis-
cussing the limitations of PaC core principle (Section 2);
• Presenting the main characteristics of data control ap-
proaches and proposing criteria to assess the possible
degree of control (Section 3);
• Evaluating the criteria by applying them in the tech-
nical and legal frameworks (Section 4);
• Demonstrating that transparency and reciprocity are
the most essential requirements towards addressing the
interdependency of privacy and surveillance (Section 5).
2. PRIVACY AS CONTROL
“Privacy as control” (PaC ) is one of three research para-
digms of privacy management approaches in the technical
and legal frameworks [10]. “Privacy as confidentiality” and
“privacy as practice” are the other two. Privacy manage-
ment approaches vary across paradigms in their approach,
assumptions and objectives. In this article, we only focus on
the PaC paradigm and data control approaches—as opposed
to anonymity, feedback, and awareness approaches that be-
long to the other two paradigms [10]. Our focus aims to
investigate the interdependency of privacy and surveillance
rooted in data control approaches in social software.
2.1 PaC in Theory
Theoretically, PaC concerns offering users as much con-
trol as possible to control their data and disclosure contexts
in social software. Users can disclose their data in commu-
nication contexts within the software. These data can be
accessed and may be used inappropriately. To manage their
privacy in social software, users should be able to control
their data, in terms of how it is accessed and handled in
contexts [25].
Controlling context means that a user should be able to
control the various ingredients in a context [25]. In social
software, a context is the information that identifies a sit-
uation within which a user can disclose a data item. For
example, in Facebook, a context is the information in a page
within which a user posts her graduation photo. The con-
text is defined by the data, the poster and the audience.
The poster discloses a data item and selects the audience.
The audience is the set of users who can view an item of
a specific poster. A data subject is a user that the item
relates to, referred to as a subject in this article. Gener-
ally, the poster discloses data for which she is the subject.
However, it is possible to post items about others; we re-
fer to those subjects as participants. Participants can also
be members of the audience who contribute to the context
with their data, e.g., post comments. Controlling context, a
user should be able to control the context ingredients in the
original context, wherein the data is first disclosed and any
dissemination context [25].
2.2 PaC in Practice
In practice, PaC is realised by data control approaches
to offer control to users over their data. Data control ap-
proaches aim at facilitating the expression, the enforcement,
and the verification of users’ control over their data. Ex-
pressing control over data requires verifying the correct ob-
servance of this control. Access control and accountability
approaches offer users various aspects of control. Access
control approaches enable users to control access to their
data. Accountability approaches verify the enforcement of
users’ control and identify misconduct.
Data control approaches offer a varying degree of data
control. Based on the assumptions and objectives of an ap-
proach, the degree of control varies [26]. In many cases, these
approaches involve functional entities that perform particu-
lar functionalities, e.g., an access control enforcement entity
or an accountability and audit entity. Functional entities are
necessary in certain approaches to perform tasks that users
are unable to perform. Functional entities are required to
have a certain degree of data control to perform their tasks.
With such control, functional entities have access to users’
data and actions. This control, in turn, limits the degree of
control users can have, e.g., by not allowing users to hide
their data from functional entities. Moreover, the realisa-
tions of these approaches and their offerings vary based on
the underlying framework. Such variance means that a con-
sistently high degree of control is not possible in PaC in
practice, as we discuss next.
2.3 Limitations of PaC and Surveillance
The main issue of PaC is that it may not be practically
possible to offer a high degree of control to social software
users [10]. In practice, users may be faced with various limi-
tations. Such limitations can be technical, legal, and ethical.
From a technical point of view, the degree of control depends
on the capabilities of the social software system, the design
of the data control approach, and the data it protects. Ad-
ditionally, the degree of control depends on the usability of
the approach. In general, users face difficulties in using PaC
approaches [24]. However, in the context of this article, we
do not focus on the usability issues of PaC. From a legal
point of view, the degree of control varies depending on in-
ternational boundaries, e.g., there is a significant difference
between the control offered by the EU Directive and the US
privacy legislations [23].
From an ethical point of view, assigning a high degree of
control to users may have counter-privacy consequences [26].
Users with a high degree of control can conceal their mali-
cious acts of violating others’ privacy, e.g., leaking data. In
such a case, assigning a high degree of control to users can
run counter to what is dictated by law. According to the law,
when data may affect other users or concerns criminal or il-
legal acts, a certain degree of supervision and the limitation
of users’ control are needed. Supervision of users’ actions
can be achieved by accountability approaches, for instance.
Such approaches entail a certain degree of surveillance.
Social software may be utilised for different forms of surveil-
lance. Social software are seen as a realisation of surveillance
in the modern society [11]. Many parties can apply surveil-
lance such as parents, marketing, recruiting companies or
governments [3]. This form of surveillance is achievable
through monitoring the data users disclose. Another form
of surveillance is functional surveillance achievable through
PaC. Functional surveillance is a fundamental part of many
data control approaches (Section 3). Functional surveillance
facilitate monitoring users disclosures, actions, trust and pri-
vacy management patterns.
The main challenge is that it is not possible to assess the
degree of control the users and other parties could have, and
the involved degree of functional surveillance. Both users
and researchers need to understand the offering of data con-
trol approaches. The inability to assess the degree of con-
trol users can have affects assessing the degree of privacy
management that can be achieved. To address this prob-
lem, an understanding of data control approaches is needed.
Based on such understanding, it is possible to assess—at a
high level—the control users can have and functional enti-
ties can have. In the following, we provide an understanding
of data control approaches and propose criteria for evaluat-
ing the control offered to users and the entailed functional
surveillance. We apply the criteria on the general aspects of
data control approaches at a high level. Such an application
demonstrates how the criteria can be used to asses any data
control approach.
3. DATA CONTROL APPROACHES
Data control approaches are means that allow users to
control how their data is handled. These approaches in-
clude access control and accountability approaches. In the
following, we discuss the realisations in the technical and
legal frameworks.
3.1 The Technical Framework
The technical framework realises data control approaches
via technical mechanisms to express, enforce and verify data
control, as described in the following.
3.1.1 Access Control
An access control mechanism enables users to control their
data. The control is achieved by composing policies based
on a specific set of features in the system to regulate and
authorise access to data [24]. For instance, a policy can
state that only users who are of a certain age can access a
specific data item. Most of the mechanisms assign control
to the poster assuming that the poster is the subject. Fewer
mechanisms may assign control to posters and participants,
i.e., the mechanism of Squicciarini et al. [29]. For each access
request of a data item, the relevant policy of the controller
is enforced. When the constraints of the policy are satisfied,
access is authorised. The enforcement of policies is executed
by an enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism
or entity is a functional entity that controls users’ data and
policies.
An access control mechanism may involve one or more
functional entities depending on the social software archi-
tecture. In centralised architectures, a central authority is
responsible for providing the social software services. The
central authority can be the enforcement functional entity.
In decentralised architectures, the data is distributed on mul-
tiple servers. These entities are the functional entities. An-
other option is deploying the services on users’ own ma-
chines, i.e., the work of Cutillo et al. [6]. In this case, the
user machine acts as a functional entity.
3.1.2 Accountability
Accountability mechanisms are based on auditing the sys-
tem to identify misconduct and anomalous actions [28]. These
mechanisms perform auditing of system logs, policy enforce-
ment transactions and users’ actions. By such auditing, they
reason about compliance with privacy rules [27]. When no
violations are detected, it is an indication of observance of
the control users have expressed.
The functioning of accountability mechanisms requires the
involvement of functional entities. The number of functional
entities depends on the social software architecture. In cen-
tralised architectures, the central authority is the functional
entity that deploys the mechanism. This entity tracks users’
actions. In decentralised architectures, the entities hosting
the social software are required to cooperate and exchange
data. These entities have to record all the information ex-
changed between users and then link them to data of other
entities [13].
3.2 The Legal Framework
The legal framework adopts PaC through data protection
legislation to protect individuals [1]. We focus on the leg-
islation of the European Directive 95/46/EC (EU Directive
1995), referred to as“the directive” in this article. The direc-
tive is (in comparison to other data protection legislation)
one of the most privacy-friendly legal regulations [23].
3.3 Access control and Accountability
The directive offers data protection via adopting account-
ability [2]—and implicitly access control. The directive states
the rights and liabilities of entities that can access and pro-
cess data. By specifying who can access and process data,
the directive also formulates access control regulations.
The directive differs from the technical framework by the
set of entities that can have control over data. Instead of as-
signing control to users, the directive distinguishes two main
entities: the data subject and the data controller. The con-
troller “determines the purposes and means” of the process-
ing (Article 2(d)), and is responsible for ensuring compliance
with the directive. In contrast to the technical framework,
the directive considers the social software provider or a third
party to be the controller. Subjects are not considered the
data controllers of their own data. According to the per-
sonal use exemption (Article 3(2))—when data is accessed
for “purely personal or household activities”—subjects are
not the data controller of their own data. Subjects may not
solely determine the purposes and means of the processing
of their data. However, subjects can be considered as con-
trollers of other subjects’ data, not their own [5].
The directive distinguishes between controlling and pro-
cessing data. The directive defines a data processor role as
the entity that can process and perform specific operations
on data on behalf of the controller. The processor is usually
not a subject. Although the data controller can solely de-
termine how subjects’ data is processed, subjects have the
right to be informed and give consent to the control of the
data controller (Article 7). The data controller is obliged to
inform subjects about its identity and purpose of processing
in order to obtain their consent (Articles 10–11). The data
controller should maintain the accuracy of data or else delete
or rectify them. However, the data controller is not subject
to those constraints in specific exceptional cases (Articles 13,
7(b–f)). The first exception (Article 13) applies when the
processing of data is necessary for the completion of tasks
of legal authorities, such as the protection of the security or
economic interests of the state, criminal investigations, or
the protection of subjects, their rights and freedoms. The
second exceptional case (Article 7(b–f)) applies when the
processing is required to comply with a contract the subject
is part of, fulfil a legal obligation, or protect the interest of
the subject or the controller.
The legal framework varies from the technical framework
in terms of the control they offer. The legal framework as-
signs the highest degree of control to the service provider,
who is also a functional entity. In a distributed architec-
ture, the number of service providers increases, and thus
the number of functional entities.
4. EVALUATIONCRITERIA FORCOMPLI-
ANCEWITH PAC
Measuring the degree of fulfilment of PaC is not possible
in general [10]. However, it is possible to assess the degree
of control offered by a data control approach by investigat-
ing the aspects that can be controlled and the degree of
functional surveillance entailed. According to the identified
context ingredients (Section 2) and a previously proposed
set of requirements for offering a high degree of control and
privacy [24], we propose the following criteria. Each of the
following criteria concerns a particular set of data control
aspects.
Control over Data Which types of data items can a sub-
ject control? What subjects have control over their
data, posters or participants? And what is the de-
gree of control the subject has? Data items can be
posted items, actions produced while using the social
software, or other inferable data.
Identifiability of the Data Subject Is the subject iden-
tifiable in the original context? Is the subject identi-
fiable in any dissemination context where her data is
put?
Audience Control What is the degree of control a sub-
ject has over her audience? And what is the degree
of control the audience have over the subject they are
the audience of? Such control means that an audience
member can select the subject to view data from.
Control over Context What is the degree of control a
subject has over the original context within which her
data is first disclosed? And what is the degree of con-
trol over any dissemination context? The degree of
satisfaction of this criteria is dependent on the satis-
faction of the above criteria. As an example, when
participants cannot control their data, this criterion is
not satisfied in relation to participants.
Degree of Functional Surveillance What is the degree
of functional surveillance applicable by a functional en-
tity?
In the following we evaluate the proposed criteria. For
each criterion, we discuss the related aspects and state the
approximate degree of satisfaction. The degree of control
can be either, high, moderate or low. If the evaluation re-
sults in a high degree of control and a low degree of func-
tional surveillance, we conclude that users can have a high
degree of control, and in principle a high degree of privacy.
The evaluation does not focus on a particular realisation,
rather, it is performed at a high level on the general aspects
shared amongst realisations. By this evaluation, we demon-
strate how to perform the evaluation at a fine-grained level
on a particular realisation.
4.1 Evaluating the Technical Framework
The criteria are applied on the main characteristics of
technical data control mechanisms.
4.1.1 Evaluating Access Control
In the following, the satisfaction of the criteria is assessed
on the main characteristics shared amongst various access
control mechanisms, surveyed in [24].
Control over Data Access: Most mechanisms offer posters
control over their posted data items. In relation to offering
control to participants, only very few mechanisms offer such
control [24], e.g., voting-based access control [31]. This cri-
terion is satisfied to a high degree in terms of controlling the
data users disclose, and to a low degree in terms of control-
ling actions or inferable data. It is satisfied to a high degree
in terms of giving control to posters, and to a low degree in
terms of giving control to participants.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Most mechanisms main-
tain posters’ identifiability in the original context, unless
anonymous mechanisms or sticky policies are used [15]. Iden-
tifiability is maintained through the policies of the poster.
The identifiability is not always possible in dissemination
contexts. The lack of participants’ control over their data
makes them not identifiable. This criterion is satisfied to a
high degree in the original context, and to a low degree in
any dissemination context in relation to posters.
Audience Control: Access control mechanisms offer sub-
jects control over their audience. This control is mainly of-
fered to posters. The control is applicable within the social
software boundaries. Posters’ control does not apply to func-
tional entities and what they may access [12]. It is not alway
possible for the audience to have control over subjects. An
example is Facebook-like access control, once a poster speci-
fies the audience, the audience will have the poster’s item in
their newsfeed. The audience cannot specify the poster and
what of her data they would like to view. This criterion is
satisfied to a moderate degree in terms of giving control to
posters over the audience to a low degree in terms of giving
control to participants, but is not satisfied in terms of giving
control to the audience.
Control over Context: Most mechanisms offer a high de-
gree of control over the original context to posters, and a lim-
ited control over dissemination contexts [25]. Offering con-
trol over dissemination contexts to users requires assigning
a higher degree of control to functional entities over users’
data and the contexts [30]. This criterion is satisfied to a
high degree in terms of controlling the original context, and
often a low degree in terms of controlling dissemination con-
texts.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: the degree of func-
tional surveillance depends on the underlying architecture.
In a centralised architecture, the enforcing entity must have
access to users’ posted data — unless the approach incor-
porates encryption to hide the content of the posted data.
Upon enforcing a policy, the entity gains knowledge about
who is denied or allowed to access a particular data item.
The enforcement entity could infer information about users’
trust patterns, amongst other information. In this archi-
tecture, the degree of functional surveillance is high due to
possible accessibility of users’ disclosed, actions or inferable
data.
In decentralised architectures, users’ data and actions are
accessible by more than one functional entity. Even when
these entities have access to a subset of the information,
they can still aggregate the information. The challenge in
this architecture is defining “trust” and “trusted entities”.
With the assumption that the trusted entities act as trusted
and do not aggregate users’ data, the functional surveillance
is lower than that encountered in the central architecture.
If the trusted entities aggregate users’ data, the degree of
functional surveillance is higher. In the case of deploying
the enforcement mechanism on the user’s own machine, no
external functional entities are required and the degree of
functional surveillance is low.
Access control mechanisms involve a relatively high de-
gree of functional surveillance. This degree adds up to the
degree of the control resulting in a moderate degree of con-
trol offered to users. The limited control offered to users is
dependent on the control offered to functional entities. The
more control functional entities have, e.g., over contexts in-
side and outside the social software, the more control users
can have.
4.1.2 Evaluating Accountability
In the following, the satisfaction of the criteria is assessed
on the main characteristics shared amongst various account-
ability mechanisms, surveyed in [1].
Control over Data: Accountability mechanisms facilitate
indirect verification of subjects’ control over only their posted
data. Since subjects cannot define policies over actions, or
inferable data (Section 4.1.1), accountability mechanisms
cannot verify control over such data. Since participants
cannot specify policies over their data, most accountabil-
ity mechanisms can only verify the observance of posters’
control. This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in rela-
tion to posted data to posters, and is not satisfied in relation
to actions or inferable data.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Accountability mecha-
nisms are based on the identifiability of subjects. To identify
accountable entities and the affected entities, every action
and data is linked to its subject. However, the identifiability
is mainly possible to the poster. This criterion is satisfied
to a high degree in relation to posters, and to a lower degree
in relation to participants.
Audience Control: Generally, these approaches check the
handling of data by other users but not the functional enti-
ties [12]. Thus, these mechanisms verify the subject’s control
over the audience within the software. Accountability mech-
anisms do not check the audience control over their subjects
when such control is missing in the access control mecha-
nism. This criterion is satisfied to a high degree in terms
of subjects controlling the audience, and is not satisfied in
terms of the audience controlling subjects.
Control over Context: Accountability mechanisms can fa-
cilitate indirect control over data even in contexts that sub-
jects do not have control over via access control mechanisms.
When a data item is leaked into a new context, accountabil-
ity mechanisms can detect the leakage in this context and
report it to the subject concerned. The subject can take the
appropriate action and thus have a certain degree of control.
This criterion is satisfied to a higher degree by accountability
mechanisms than by access control mechanisms.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: accountability mecha-
nisms are strongly coupled with surveillance. The surveil-
lance in these approaches takes the form of monitoring users’
data and actions in order to identify misconduct. The degree
of functional surveillance is dependent on the architecture.
In a centralised architecture, the auditing entity has access
to all users’ data. In decentralised architectures, the func-
tional entities have access to a subset of the data. Also,
functional entities might need to aggregate data to identify
misconduct, e.g., when a data item is leaked from one user
to others, the auditing entities should aggregate their data
to trace how the data item has moved from one user to an-
other. This architecture entails a higher degree of functional
surveillance than that of the centralised architecture.
Accountability mechanisms offer a moderate degree of con-
trol. At the same time, they comprise a higher degree of
functional surveillance. In access control, users do not have
control over who can access their actions and relational data.
Yet, such data is utilised by accountability mechanisms to
verify the observance of users’ control over their posted data.
Accountability mechanisms involve a high degree of func-
tional surveillance by utilising the uncontrollable data to
verify the control over controllable data.
In summary the technical framework offers a high degree
of control on internal audiences and original contexts. At
the same time, the framework involves a high degree of
functional surveillance. Thus, the degree of total privacy
achieved in this framework is moderate.
4.2 Evaluating the Legal Framework
In the following, the criteria are applied on aspects of
access control and accountability regulations in the directive.
4.2.1 Evaluating Access Control
The criteria are satisfied to variant degrees as discussed
in the following.
Control over Data: Subjects have control over any identi-
fying data whether posted or processed by automatic means
(Article 3(1)). The control is possible for posters, and par-
ticipants as long as the data identifies them. However, the
data controller solely specifies and enforces the terms of how
the data can be used, and, as a result, has a higher degree
of control than the subject. Subjects’ control is limited to
the right to consent. This right allows the subject to either
accept or reject the processing terms of the data controller,
as long as the exceptions are not applicable (Article 7(b–f)).
This criterion is satisfied to a relatively high degree in terms
of controlling different data types of different subject types
as long as exceptions do not apply. However this control is
not as granular as the control users have in the technical
framework.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Identifiability in any
context is required by the directive to allow subjects to ac-
cess and receive information about their data when it is to
be processed (Articles 10–12). This criterion is satisfied to
a high degree.
Audience Control: The directive states that subjects can
specify their audience within the social software. Also, sub-
jects have a limited degree of control over the data con-
troller — by the right to consent — who controls external
audiences, and processors. Also, the directive does not offer
control to audience members over subjects. This criterion
is satisfied to a high degree in terms of controlling audience
within the social software users, and to a moderate degree in
relation to controlling functional entities and external audi-
ences. It is not satisfied in terms of the audience controlling
their subjects.
Control of Context: this criterion is satisfied to a high
degree in terms of controlling any context by the right to
consent.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: the access control regu-
lations involve a high degree of functional surveillance. The
data controller is the functional entity responsible for the
enforcement of the control offered to subjects. The con-
troller specifies the terms of data processing, and has access
to all the data to enforce the terms. Additionally, external
functional entities can access the data to conduct certain in-
vestigations. In such cases, the monitoring or surveillance of
subjects facilitates performing the investigation tasks. Such
surveillance is explicitly exempted from being reported to
subjects (Article 13(f)). The degree of functional surveil-
lance is higher than the degree of functional surveillance in
the technical framework.
4.2.2 Evaluating Accountability
The satisfaction of the criteria varies as discussed in the
following.
Control over Data: The regulations oblige the data con-
troller to inform data subjects of how their data are used.
If the processing does not comply to what the subject has
consented to, the subject can complain. If the exception
of (Article 13) applies, subjects may not be entitled to this
right. And subjects have no right to know why their data
is being processed and by whom. This criterion is satisfied
to a high degree in terms verifying the observance of control
over all data types as long as exemptions do not apply.
Identifiability of the Data Subject: Identifiability is re-
quired by the accountability regulations to facilitate iden-
tifying subjects who are accountable for misconduct. This
criterion is satisfied to a higher degree than the degree of
satisfaction in the technical framework.
Audience Control: The directive allows subjects to verify
how their data is being processed by the controller or the
processor, as long as exceptions are not applicable. Thus,
subjects can verify the observance of the control they have
over their data by functional entities and external audiences
(Article 3(2)). This criterion is satisfied to a high degree
in terms of verifying the control over functional entities and
external audiences, but it is not satisfied in terms of verifying
the control of the audience on subjects.
Control of Context: Through the obligation of informing
the subjects about the purpose of processing data (Articles
10–11), subjects can be aware of contexts their data is put
in. Subjects, however, cannot limit the processing of data in
a specific context if they have given their consent or if the
processing is necessary (Article 7). This criterion is satis-
fied to a moderate degree with regards to verifying subjects’
limited control over internal and external contexts.
Degree of Functional Surveillance: to verify the obser-
vance of terms of processing by the data controller and
the processor, a high degree of functional surveillance is re-
quired. Such functional surveillance is performed by exter-
nal functional entities and legal authorities that access all
data available about subjects, the data controller, and the
data processors. As a result, the accountability regulations
entail a high degree of functional surveillance.
In summary, the legal framework involves a high degree
of surveillance to enforce rules and facilitate the control to
users on external entities and contexts. Thus, the degree of
privacy achieved in this framework is moderate.
The main difference between the technical and legal frame-
work is the scope of the offered control. The technical frame-
work offers control of variant granularity. Users can express
detailed or very simple and coarse-grained control, accord-
ing to the technical mechanism used. In contrast, the legal
framework offers static and large-scale control. The regula-
tions that offer control cannot be changed by users, but they
apply on a large scale–within and beyond the social soft-
ware boundaries. Another difference is that in the technical
framework violations are detected sooner than violations in
the legal framework. In the legal framework, detecting viola-
tions requires checking compliance to regulations by external
authorities. Such checking may not occur periodically, as is
the case in the technical framework.
5. THE INTERDEPENDENCYOFPRIVACY
AND SURVEILLANCE
The interdependency of privacy and surveillance is inher-
ent in the design of data control approaches. In the pre-
vious sections, we discussed how functional surveillance is
part of data control approaches. Giving users a high degree
of control over dissemination contexts, for instance, requires
increasing functional surveillance to detect disseminations
of data in any context. The interdependency of privacy
and surveillance is manifested in how functional surveillance
serves offering better privacy, and how privacy aims at mit-
igating surveillance. In the following, we propose recom-
mendations that are essential when the interdependency is
present in an approach.
5.1 Recommendations
The variation in the degree of control, privacy and surveil-
lance between PaC approaches in the two frameworks sug-
gest the need for a holistic PaC approach. The variation
emerges from the differences in the perspectives and the as-
pects focused on by an approach. Addressing privacy issues
and legal concerns at the same time requires an approach
that merges the offerings of the technical and legal frame-
works. Developing such an approach requires taking into
consideration the interdependency of privacy and surveil-
lance, rather than focusing on only privacy issues [7]. The
first step towards developing a better data control approach
is adopting transparency and reciprocity.
Transparency is essential to address the dependence of
PaC on surveillance. The functional surveillance in data
control approaches may turn the social software platforms
into a panopticon. In a panopticon setting, individuals should
be aware that they are being surveilled. If users are aware
of surveillance they can choose what data to disclose in
such a platform [16]. Similarly, social software users should
be aware of the degree of surveillance in data control ap-
proaches [7]. In this case, users can experience being in
surveillance spaces and develop appropriate strategies [17]
— assuming they are not faced with usability issues of data
control approaches.
Reciprocity must be adopted to support transparency.
Reciprocity means that if a surveillant entity can monitor
users, then users should be able to monitor such an entity [4].
Reciprocity starts with transparency. Once surveillance is
transparent, users would able to observe the conduct of the
surveilling entity. Reciprocity can be replaced by feedback
to users about how their data is handled. Feedback is a
“privacy as practice” approach [10]. Thus, with reciprocity,
users may achieve privacy as practice as well.
5.2 Transparency and Reciprocity in Practice
As an example of the benefit of transparency and reci-
procity, consider the case of Facebook use in Syria. Face-
book and Youtube were blocked in Syria until after the up-
rising in Egypt. The uprising in Egypt coincided with Face-
book calls for demonstrations in Syria. At that point, the
ban was lifted as a reward for the people who did not re-
spond to the calls [19, 18]. This meant that individuals need
not use Tor anonymous communication networks [8]. With-
out Tor proxies, the identities and communication of indi-
viduals will be known to the ISP [12]. Such unintentional
transparency and reciprocity about the potential behaviour
of the authorities made it clear for activists that the moti-
vation for the lift of the ban could be to prevent anonymous
communication and to surveil individuals — given the his-
tory of the country. Later reports suggest that surveillance
was the reason for the ban was being lift [22]. In this sce-
nario, it is the knowledge about potential surveillance that
can empower individuals to carefully use social software and
select what to disclose, following the recommendation of Mc-
Grath [17]. Such a change of behaviour is also observed in
the spike of web searches about surveillance after Snowden’s
revelations [21]. After the revelations about possible surveil-
lance by the government, searches about surveillance were
increased. The increase indicates that users were interested
in gaining more knowledge about how surveillance can be
applied, avoided, etc.
6. RELATEDWORK
Similar analyses of privacy management approaches have
been conducted earlier. In the technical framework, Danezis
and Gu¨rses provide a review of privacy technologies and
highlight the entanglement of privacy and surveillance in
technologies [7]. Their review covers a wide selection of
technologies developed between 2000 and 2010, but mainly
focuses on anonymous communication and identity manage-
ment technologies. Their review argues that total control
of data is an illusion, and that privacy technologies can be
turned into surveillance tools. While their review focuses on
the three privacy paradigms — privacy as control, privacy
as confidentiality and privacy as practice — our work dif-
fers in focusing just on privacy as control (PaC). Our work
extends the analysis of PaC to the legal framework. Our
work also differs in conceptualising functional surveillance
as one factor that facilitates using technologies for surveil-
lance. Another difference is our proposed criteria that can be
applied on any approach to assess the degree of control and
surveillance. The criteria can be applied on anonymous com-
munication, identity management approaches, or any other
approach within PaC.
In another work, Gu¨rses and Diaz focus on surveillance
and social privacy issues in social software [12]. These issues
relate to the aspects discussed in our work. Data control ap-
proaches facilitate social privacy management to avoid viola-
tions and surveillance. The authors argue that surveillance
and social privacy issues are entangled, and that privacy
management approaches should not address one of these is-
sues and ignore the other. We also examine data control ap-
proaches comprehensively and show that this entanglement
is a functional requirement for data control approaches. We
argue that aiming to give as much control as possible to users
may not address this entanglement, since functional surveil-
lance is a fundamental aspect of data control approaches.
Our work also differs in that we consider data control ap-
proaches in the legal framework, while Gu¨rses and Diaz do
not focus on data protection regulations. The questions pro-
posed by Gu¨rses and Diaz for eliciting information useful
to developing a holistic privacy management approach can
be integrated with our proposed criteria. Such an integra-
tion provides detailed information towards developing holis-
tic approaches.
The concept of functional surveillance has been examined
by other authors. The work of Gurevich et al. conceptu-
alises ‘inverse privacy’ [9] that relates to our conceptualisa-
tion of functional surveillance. Inverse privacy refers to the
concept of collecting information about users without their
knowledge. Inversely private data is data that the user is
unaware of, yet, it is accessed by entities unknown to the
user in a way that can be inappropriate. In our work, func-
tional surveillance facilitates inverse privacy by facilitating
the collection of information about users’ actions and usage
of data control approaches. Our proposed criteria can be
applied to assess the degree of inverse privacy.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In PaC, users cannot control their data without relying
on the control of functional entities. In the comparative
analysis presented in this article, we show the complemen-
tarity between access control and accountability. We also
show the variation in the realisations of PaC in the technical
and the legal frameworks. The realisations of data control
approaches offer varying degrees of control and functional
surveillance. These offerings result in an interdependency of
privacy and surveillance. The analysis explicates the reasons
for this interdependency.
The application of the proposed criteria is promising for
the assessment of the degree of privacy and the degree of
surveillance of a specific approach. Such an assessment is
fundamental and should not be skipped by researchers. Us-
ing the criteria would decrease developing approaches that
address certain privacy issues and cause others, such as
surveillance. The criteria should be adopted to decrease
the ambiguity about the degree of control and privacy an
approach can offer. As well as making clear the possible
surveillance aspect that may result from adopting a partic-
ular data control approach.
In the future work, we aim at providing an example for
developing a data control approach and assessing the possi-
ble degree of control, privacy and surveillance it offers. We
aim at developing our previously-proposed contextual pri-
vacy management framework and using the proposed crite-
ria to assess it [25]. The framework is designed to comply
with the data control aspects discussed in this paper to of-
fer fine-grained control over context. We plan to provide an
example of how the criteria can be applied on a particular
approach. We also seek to investigate possible quantification
methods of the degree of control, privacy and surveillance.
The main objective of this work, and future work, is to pro-
vide a method to investigate privacy and the other side of
privacy, surveillance in data control approaches.
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